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Abstract 
This article aims at identifying the leading indicators of currency crises in Turkey in its post-
liberalization history through the signals approach introduced by Kaminsky et al (1998). Based on a 
broad set of potential indicators, a number of variables are found to be persistently signaling the 
currency crises during the period 1980:01-2006:06. Particularly, variables such as short-term 
debt/international reserves, imports, exports, M2/international reserves, and current account 
balance/GDP are consistent with the results of previous work in the literature. Analysis of the average 
lead time of the indicators reveals that the first signal is issued 4.4 months before a crisis erupts with 
public debt/GDP offering the longest lead time with 10.2 months, and government consumption/GDP 
offering the shortest with 2.2 months. Analysis of the persistence of the indicators reveals that the 
indicator issuing the most persistent signals is the government consumption/GDP and the one issuing 
the least persistent signals is FDI/GDP. Results are encouraging from the vantage point of an early 
warning system since signaling, on average, occurs sufficiently early to allow preemptive policy 
actions. 
 
JEL. F30, E44 
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I. Introduction 
  Integration of emerging economies into the world financial system through financial 
liberalization has exposed them to speculative short-term capital movements and rendered them 
vulnerable to currency crises. Country experiences have shown that these reforms have led to severe 
problems of capital inflows and real exchange rate misalignments, and in most cases, to financial 
crises (Grabel, 1995). Turkey is one of the emerging economies that bought into the promises of the 
IMF-prompted financial liberalization in 1980s. Thereafter, the country has witnessed a number of 
currency crises, devaluations and a number of speculative attacks.  
  The literature contains only a handful of empirical studies that examine the currency crises in 
Turkey. These studies specifically focus on the crises of 1994 and 2000-2001, paying less attention to 
the periods of unsuccessful attacks on the Turkish Lira. In addition, the currency crunch that the 
country experienced in May 2006 has received no attention from the researchers to date. Hence, the 
literature clearly lacks a comprehensive study that investigates the root causes of all currency crises 
that Turkey has experienced to date in its post-liberalization history. As evident from the global 
turmoil in 2006 which led to around 20% depreciation of the Turkish Lira against the US Dollar, the 
likelihood of future currency crises in Turkey remains high. In today's increasingly interdependent 
world, finding ways to reduce the risk of future crises has become an international policy challenge of 
enormous importance. Accordingly, identification of the root causes of such crises so that policy 
makers can take preventative measures to mitigate or even prevent them has gained utmost 
importance.  
  The motivation of the present article is to identify the leading indicators of the currency crises 
in Turkey in its post-liberalization history through signals approach and to make a contribution to the 
knowledge in the area of financial crises through filling an important gap in the related literature. 
Although the research will be conducted over only Turkey, results will have implications that extend 
beyond this country and will apply to all other emerging market economies with similar 
macroeconomic structures. The contribution of this article to the existing literature is two-fold: Firstly, 
signals approach introduced by Kaminsky et al. (1998) will be applied to Turkish economy for the 
period 1980:01-2006:06 using monthly time series data. This approach is well-suited for finding 
vulnerabilities in an economy as it immediately reveals the variables that causes the crises and 
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facilitates the establishment of indicator rankings. An obvious advantage of this approach is that it 
imposes no restriction on the number of explanatory variables and that it is easily applicable to a 
single-country analysis. Therefore, it is useful for designing policy responses as the economic 
variables which issue warning signals can immediately be identified. Secondly, a broad set of 
financial, macroeconomic, and political variables will be tested to capture their possible impact on the 
crises.  
  The present study is the first Turkey-specific, single-country currency crisis study which has 
such a broad sample period and a long list of potential leading indicators. The feature that separates 
the present study from the previous empirical work on the currency crises in Turkey is that it employs 
monthly data covering the entire post-liberalization period rather than focusing on certain crisis 
episodes in this period. This enables us to monitor the potential leading indicators from a broader 
perspective. 
  The rest of the article is structured as follows: The next section will review the existing 
currency crisis literature on Turkey as well as the earlier applications of the signals approach. Section 
III will introduce the data used and the methodology that is followed. Section IV will present the 
empirical results and the last section will point out the conclusions that emerge from the study.  
 
II. Literature Review  
  There exist only a handful of country-specific empirical studies on the currency crises in 
Turkey. Earlier studies by Neftci and Ozmucur (1991) and Ozmucur (1991) investigated the general 
economic downturns rather than analyzing currency crises. Neftci and Ozmucur (1991) identified a 
number of coincident indicators of economic activity using monthly data for the period 1980–1990, 
whereas Ozmucur (1991) managed to predict seven out of eight years with bottlenecks in the economy 
using logit and probit models using annual data for the period 1950–1991.  
  The currency crisis of 1994 heightened the interest in the root causes of currency crises. 
Hence, a stream of empirical effort emerged particularly to identify the determinants of currency 
crises. The earliest example is Ucer et al. (1998) who examined the currency crisis of 1994 using 
signals approach based on quarterly data. In addition to the original indicators used in the signals 
approach of Kaminsky et al. (1998), the authors tested several new indicators and concluded that the 
crisis could be explained by the fluctuations in short-term foreign debt/GNP, exports/imports, short-
term advances to Treasury/GNP, and (M2+domestic debt)/GNP. Kibritcioglu et al (1999) also 
analyzed the crisis of 1994 using the leading indicators approach based on monthly data. The authors 
tested a broad set of indicators and identified effective real exchange rate, exports/imports, foreign 
trade balance/GDP, current account balance/GDP, and short-term capital movements/GDP as the 
leading indicators of their crisis index. Feridun (2004) tested the hypothesis that political 
considerations account for the crisis of February 2001 using a linear probability model for the 1982-
2001 period. He found that the number of political parties in the government, and the timing of 
elections were significant in explaining the crisis. In an application of the Markov regime switching 
model of exchange rate movements to Turkish economy, Mariano et al tested both monthly and 
weekly models and found real exchange rate, foreign exchange reserves and domestic credit/deposit 
ratio to be the most important determinants of financial vulnerability. Parlaktuna (2005) used Ordinary 
Least Squares regression with an exchange market pressure index for the period 1993–2004 using 
quarterly data. She found strong evidence of negative relation between domestic credit and exchange 
market pressure during the period under study. In a recent study, a similar index was utilized by Cepni 
and Kose (2006) who used Granger-causality analysis to investigate the determinants of the index 
using quarterly data for the period 1985-2004. The authors found that current account/GDP ratio, 
M2/international reserves ratio, real credit growth and current account/foreign direct investment ratio 
Granger-caused the index.  
The present article offers an application of the signals approach to Turkey based on a broad 
range of variables and a long time frame. There are various applications of Kaminsky et al’s (1998) 
signals approach in the literature. A summary of these studies is provided in Table 1. The present 
study aims at making a contribution to this stream of studies by analyzing the currency crises in 
Turkey.  
 
<Table 1 about here > 
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III. Data and Methodology 
  The signals approach consists of several steps such as defining the potential explanatory 
variables, identifying crisis periods, setting a signaling horizon and a threshold level, and then 
classifying the signals.  
 
Defining Potential Indicators 
  Potential explanatory variables are derived from theories about currency crises and in light of 
the results of the previous empirical studies. Another major consideration is the availability of data. In 
this study, a much broader set of variables are employed than that of Kaminsky et al (1998).1 
Variables are selected to reflect the conditions of current account, capital account, financial sector, real 
sector, fiscal sector, the global economy and the political setting. The data is monthly and spans the 
period between 1980:01 and 2006:06. As Goldstein et al (2000) explain, monthly data allows us to 
learn much more about the timing of early warning indicators, including differences among indicators 
in the first arrival and persistence of signals. Some variables are available only in annual or quarterly 
frequency. Hence, these variables are linearly interpolated into monthly series.  
  In order to enhance the possibility of identifying the crisis factors, the present study employs 
thirty-eight variables. The time series data is obtained from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics 
database, the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey’s Electronic Data Dissemination System, as well 
as the World Bank’s World Development Indicators and Global Development Finance Statistics 
databases. Table 2 presents the list of potential pre-crisis indicators considered, provides justification 
to their selection, and indicates the sources of the data. A disadvantage of using low frequency data is 
the possible presence of seasonal effects. This problem is circumvented by using 12-month percentage 
changes following the earlier studies in the literature. This practice comes in handy in eliminating 
seasonal effects, avoiding the possible non-stationarity problem of the variables in levels, and in 
rendering the indicators more comparable across time (Goldstein et al, 2000). This filter is not used 
for: the deviation of the real exchange rate from the trend, excess of real M1 balances, and the interest 
rates.  
 
Defining Crisis Periods 
  In order to measure the magnitude of exchange market pressure and to identify the periods of 
currency crises, an index is built using the changes in exchange rates, interest rates, and international 
reserves of the Central Bank. This is because, when there are speculative attacks on currency, the 
government has three policy choices: it can let the exchange rate depreciate, it can intervene in the 
foreign exchange markets by selling international reserves, or it can increase interest rates to attract 
capital inflows in order to offset the speculative pressures on domestic currency. It is possible to use a 
combination of these three policy options to fend off speculative pressures. Hence, the index needs to 
reflect both successful and unsuccessful speculative attacks on domestic currency. In a single-country 
study where the sample period covers both pegged and managed-floating exchange rate regimes, the 
most appropriate choice of index seems to be the one taking into consideration the changes in 
exchange rates, interest rates, and international reserves of the Central Bank. Therefore, the present 
analysis uses Eichengreen et al’s (1995) Exchange Market Pressure (EMP) index rather than that of 
Kaminsky et al (1998) because the latter does not include interest rates. This index is chosen 
particularly because it is a model-independent, weighted index and it takes into consideration a 
reference country. Hence, it is more informative than the other variants of the EMP index in the 
literature.  
  The weights attached to the three components of the index, which are the inverse of the 
standard deviation for each component, equalize the volatilities of the three components and prevents 
the component with the highest volatility dominating the index. The index is calculated as follows:  
 
                                                          
1 Indicators used by Kaminsky et al (1998) are: international reserves; imports; exports; terms of trade; 
deviations of the real exchange rate from trend; the differential between foreign and domestic real interest rates; 
excess real M1 balances; the M2 multiplier; domestic credit/GDP; the real interest rate; lending rate/deposit rate; 
commercial bank deposits; M2/international reserves; index of output; and an index of equity prices. 
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EMPt = αΔet + βΔ(it - i*t) - γ(Δτ,t-Δr*t)                                (1) 
  
where α, β and γ are weights that equalize the conditional volatilities of each component. More 
specifically, α=(1/σe), β=(1/σi) and γ=(1/σr) where σe is the standard deviation of et, σi is the standard 
deviation of (it - i*t) and σr is the standard deviation of (Δτ,t-Δr*t). Δeit is the monthly change in the 
exchange rate, i denotes the domestic interest rate, i*t corresponds to the same variable but for the 
country of reference, τ,t is the ratio of foreign reserves to domestic money (M1) for the domestic 
country and, r*t denotes the same concept for the country of reference. The higher the standard 
deviation, the lower weight would be imposed on the corresponding variable.  
  The index captures either a successful attack (a sharp devaluation), or a successful defense 
(the exchange rate remains unchanged but the monetary authorities deter an attack by a combination of 
interest rate increases and foreign market interventions), or an unsuccessful defense (all three variables 
move sharply). A positive value of the index measures the depreciation pressure of the currency that 
can be signaled by a nominal depreciation, a widening of the interest rate spread, or a loss of foreign 
reserves, whereas a negative value of the index measures the appreciation pressure of the currency. 
Data used to calculate the index are as follows: Exchange rate is the TL/USD nominal exchange rate, 
interest rate is the nominal exchange rates (3-month deposit rate for Turkey and prime loan rate for 
USA), international reserves are reserves-gold and M1 is the narrow money (M1). 
   When the value of EMP exceeds a certain threshold value, the country is considered to have a 
currency crisis. The threshold value, in the present study, is determined as: 
 
Threshold value = μEMP + 1.5(σEMP)                                    (2) 
where μEMP  is the mean of the index and σEMP is the standard deviation of the index. A currency crisis 
is observed when the value of the EMP index exceeds this threshold value.  The value of 1.5 is used 
following Herrera and Garcia (1999) as it gives the best estimation of crises2. The pressure points that 
have been identified by the index are 1982:01, 1983:06, 1985:01, 1991:01, 1994:01, 2001:01 and 
2006:06. 
 
<Figure 1 about here> 
 
Defining a Signaling Horizon 
  When an indicator exceeds or falls below a pre-determined threshold, then it is said to issue a 
signal that a currency crisis may occur within a given period. This period is defined as the signaling 
horizon or crisis window. In the literature, the time-window spans from 6 months to 24 months3. In the 
present analysis, the signaling horizon for financial distress will be defined as 12 months. This is 
determined in light of the number of observations and crises, and the grid search for optimal 
percentiles.  
 
Defining a Threshold Level and Classifying Signals 
  An individual indicator is only accepted as sending a warning signal when it goes beyond its 
own threshold value. If the threshold is too loose, the indicator will catch all the crises, but will also 
give lots of false signals, i.e. noise. If the threshold is too tight, the indicator will not issue a false 
signal, but it may miss many crises. An optimal signal is, therefore, one that is followed by a crisis 
within the signaling horizon. When a variable issues a signal and a crisis does not follow within the 
crisis window, it is considered a noise. The outcome for each indicator can be considered in terms of a 
two by two matrix, shown in Table 2.  
 
<Table 2 about here> 
 
                                                          
2 Different thresholds have been tested and it has been found out that a higher threshold misses the currency 
crunch of May 2006 whereas a lower threshold leads to too many crisis episodes. 
3 For instance, El-Shazly (2002) uses a 6-month, Brüggemann and Linne (2002) use a 18-month, and Kaminsky 
et al (1998) use a 24-month signaling horizon. 
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  For each variable there are four possible categories A, B, C, and D. A is the number of months 
a good signal was sent (a crisis is correctly signaled), B is the number of months a false alarm signal 
was sent, C is the number of months in which no signal was sent but a crises followed, and D is the 
number of months in which no signal was sent and no crises followed. Any fluctuations of the 
indicator beyond the threshold are considered abnormal and are taken as a signal that a crisis could 
occur in the next 12 months. The noise-to-signal ratio (NSR) is the ratio of false signals to good 
signals and is calculated as: 
 
NSR = [B/(B+D)]/[A/(A+C)]                                                (3) 
 
  The threshold level for each variable is chosen to minimize the NSR, which is used as a 
criterion for deciding which indicators to remove from the list of potential indicators. A signaling 
device that issues signals at random times would obtain an NSR equal to unity. Hence, those indicators 
which produce more false alarms than good signals, i.e. those having an NSR of above unity, are not 
helpful in predicting crises and are therefore excluded from further analysis.  
 For each of the indicators, a two-step procedure is used to obtain the optimal set of thresholds 
that will be employed in the empirical application: First, thresholds are defined in relation to 
percentiles of the distribution of observations of the indicator. Second, a grid of a reference percentile 
is considered and the optimal set of thresholds is defined as the one that minimizes the NSR ratio. In 
order to determine the variable-specific optimal threshold values, one of the two grids of reference 
percentiles between 70 percent and 95 percent or 5 percent and 30 of the distribution are employed, 
depending on the expected impact of the variable, for each measure. For some variables a decline in 
the indicator increases the probability of a crisis, hence the threshold is below the mean of the 
indicator. For other variables the opposite is the case. The information about the expected impact of 
each variable is given in Table 4.  
  Another way to interpret the results is by comparing the probability of a crisis, P(C), 
conditional on a signal from the indicator A/(A+B), with the unconditional probability of a crisis the 
conditional probability of crisis P(C|S) which is calculated as: 
 
P(Crisis/ Signal)-P(crisis) = (A+C)/(A+B+C+D)           (4) 
 
Where A, B, C, D represent the cells in the matrix in Table 2. The conditional probability should 
display higher scores than the simple probability of crisis. If the indicator has useful information, the 
conditional probability will be higher than the unconditional one (Kaminsky et al 1998).  
 
IV. Empirical Results 
  Table 4 presents the estimated thresholds, the calculations of the NSR and P(Crisis/ Signal)-
P(crisis) for each variable, and ranks the potential early warning indicators of currency crises 
according to their NSRs. From these estimates, it is clear that the set of indicators for which the 
conditional probability of a crisis is lower than the unconditional probability is the same as the set for 
which the NSR is higher than unity. Based on these two criteria, the following variables lacked 
predictive power and were removed from the list of potential indicators: Real effective exchange rate 
overvaluation, industrial production index, trade balance/GDP, stock market index, public debt/GDP, 
domestic real interest rates, government changes, oil prices, M1, and FDI/GDP. 
 
<Table 4 about here> 
  A straightforward way of capturing the fragility of the economy at the onset of crisis is to keep 
track of the number of signals being issued in the economy. The larger the number of signals, the 
higher is the probability of a financial distress. The number of signals issued by each indicator can be 
observed by eyeballing the graphs of individual indicators given in Appendix I. The shaded areas in 
the graphs mark the 12-month window before crises. The greater the incidence of the flashing 
indicators within these windows, the more vulnerable the economy is to a crisis.  
  A drawback of the signal’s approach is that, in focusing on the 12-month window prior to the 
onset of the crisis, the criteria for ranking the indicators in Table 2 does not distinguish between a 
between an indicator that sends signals well before the crisis occurs and one that signals only when the 
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crisis is imminent.  In order to evaluate the performances of indicators, one should also consider the 
average number of months prior to crisis the first good signal occurs because a variable with lower 
NSR can be a useful leading indicator of currency crises only if it sends warning signals sufficiently 
early to enable policymakers to take preemptive measures to prevent approaching crises. Therefore, in 
addition to the ranking of the indicators according to their ability to predict crises, lead time of the 
signal is also estimated. Table 5 presents the average number of months in advance of the crisis when 
the first signal occurs. 
<Table 5 about here> 
 
  On average, indicators send the first signal 4.4 months before the crisis erupts, with public 
debt/GDP offering the longest lead time and government consumption/GDP offering the shortest. 
Overall, it can be concluded that the indicators considered are leading rather than coincident. From the 
vantage point of an early warning system, the results are encouraging in that signaling, on average, 
occurs sufficiently early to allow for preemptive policy actions. 
 
Persistence of the Signals 
Another desirable feature in the potential leading indicators is that signals be more persistent prior to 
crises during the 12-month window than at other times. Table 6 presents a summary measure of the 
persistence of the signals measured as the average number of signals per period during the pre-crisis 
period compared to tranquil times4. Indicators are ranked according to their performance. The 
indicator issuing the most persistent signals is the government consumption/GDP and the one issuing 
the least persistent signals is FDI/GDP.  
 
<Table 6 about here> 
 
In addition to counting the number of signaling indicators, individual indicators can be combined into 
a composite indicator for convenience 
 
Composite Indicator 
  The information provided by all the indicators can be combined to a composite indicator in 
order to assess the likelihood of crises. Following Kaminsky (1998), the signaling information of 
indicators are combined by calculating a single composite crisis indicator. The composite crisis 
indicator is defined as a weighted-sum of the signaling indicators, where each indicator is weighted by 
the inverse of its NSR. The composite indicator is calculated as: 
 
 
(5) 
where S is equal to 1 if indicator j crosses the threshold and 0, if otherwise. ωj is the NSR of indicator 
j. The index weights more heavily the indicators with low noise-to-signal ratios relative to those 
variables with a high noise-to-signal ratio since they are more reliable in predicting crises. The choice 
of variables used in the construction of a composite indicator is based on the values of their NSRs. 
Goldstein et al (2000) propose the elimination of a variable whose NSR exceeds unity since such a 
variable can be considered a poor indicator as its conditional probability of a crisis is lower than its 
unconditional probability of a crisis. Hence, the NTS value of 1 is used as the border value that 
separates indicators to be used in the construction of a composite indicator. Figure 2 shows the 
evolution of the composite index.  
 
<Figure 2 about here> 
 
  The composite index offers some guidance in analyzing the data and identifying zones of 
vulnerability. Although the composite indicator only serves for information purposes, the value of the 
indicator does not directly provide any measure of the probability of a currency crisis being imminent 
and does not say anything about the dynamics of the currency crisis process. However, it allows, for 
                                                          
4  The measures in Table 6 are just the inverse of the individual NSRs. 
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certain composite index value intervals, the calculation of the corresponding conditional probability of 
a future crisis (Berg and Pattillo, 1998).  
 
Conditional Probability of Crises 
  While the index itself can be used to observe changes in the intensity of currency crisis 
signals, it is difficult to infer from its values the likelihood that a country will experience a crisis. 
Therefore, following, inter alia, Edison (2003) Brüggemann and Linne (2002), Pastenak (2003), 
Knedlik (2006), conditional probabilities for currency crises are calculated. The sample-based 
probability of a crisis for each value of the composite crisis indicator is computed by observing how 
often a given value of the index is followed by a crisis within 12 months. More precisely, the 
conditional probability of crisis is calculated as the ratio between the sum of months in which the 
monthly composite indicator k is higher than or at lower threshold value Il and lower than the upper 
threshold Iu with a currency crisis following the next 12 months, and the same sum of months without 
the precondition of a currency crisis. The conditional probabilities of a currency crisis are calculated as 
follows: 
 
Pr(Ct, t+12|It=j) = (Months with I=j and a crisis within 12 months)/(Months with I=j)        (6) 
 
where k is the composite crisis indicator, Pr(Ct, t-12|kt=j)is the conditional probability of a crisis in the 
time interval {t, t+12 months} given that the composite crisis indicator at time t is equal to j. 
 
<Table 7 about here> 
 
  Table 7 displays the conditional probabilities and the significant scores for the probability of 
crisis during the 12 months preceding crises that are associated with different values of the weighted 
composite index. Given this method, the highest probability of a crisis is 75 percent in the interval 15 
≤ kt < 20. This result is well above the results of the previous studies in the literature. A possible 
explanation for this finding is that those studies are generally multi-country studies where the results 
might not be consistent among the different countries in sample. 
 
V. Conclusions 
  The present study has identified the leading indicators of currency crises in Turkey between 
1980:01 and 2006:06 through signals approach introduced by Kaminsky et al (1998). In general, 
results are consistent with the previous work in the literature. Particularly, variables such as short-term 
debt/international reserves, imports, exports, M2/international reserves, and current account 
balance/GDP receive strong support from the existing empirical literature. As regards the average lead 
time, indicators send the first signal 4.4 months before the crisis erupts, with public debt/GDP offering 
the longest lead time and government consumption/GDP offering the shortest. As to the persistence of 
the indicators, the indicator issuing the most persistent signals is the government consumption/GDP 
and the one issuing the least persistent signals is FDI/GDP. From the vantage point of an early 
warning system, the results are encouraging in that signaling, on average, occurs sufficiently early to 
allow preemptive policy actions. 
  Nevertheless, results must be treated with caution because, since the interaction among 
variables is ignored by this approach, the actual reasons for crises may be obscured. In addition, the 
inclusion or exclusion of variables in the composite index and may change not only the index itself but 
also the calculated conditional probabilities of crises. Having established the relevance of the chosen 
set of variables as the leading indicators, there emerges the question of the validity of a functional 
relationship between the dichotomous variable of a currency crisis and these indicators. Existence of 
such relationship can be econometrically examined by a logit or probit model. This is left for future 
study.  
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 Table 1. A Summary of the Empirical Studies using the Signals Approach 
Reference Sample / Period Variables / Frequency Crisis Index / Threshold Significant Variables / Conclusions 
Kaminsky et al. (1998) 20 developing and 
industrial countries 
(1970-1995) 
Monthly variables capturing 
external balance, monetary 
factors and equity movements. 
Weighted average of 
exchange rate and reserve 
changes. Threshold: Mean 
+3 std. dev. 
The real exchange rate, exports growth rate, 
banking crises dummy, stock price index, 
M2/international reserves, output growth, 
excess M1 balances, growth rate of the 
domestic credit/GDP 
Ucer et al. (1998) Turkey (1986-1999) Variables of Kaminsky et al. 
(1997) 
Index and threshold of 
Kaminsky et al. (1998) 
Short-term foreign debt/ GNP, 
exports/imports, short-term advances to 
Treasury/GNP,  (M2+domestic debt)/GNP 
Berg and Patillo (1999) 13 European and 
emerging countries 
(1970-1995) 
Variables of Kaminsky et al. 
(1997) + M2/reserves and 
current account/GDP 
Index and threshold of 
Kaminsky et al. (1998) 
Domestic credit, real exchange rate, 
M2/international reserves, exports, 
international reserves, current account/GDP 
Kaminsky and Reinhart 
(1999) 
Countries and the period 
of Kaminsky et al. (1998) 
Monthly banking sector and 
financial indicators 
Index and threshold of 
Kaminsky et al. (1998) 
Currency crises precede banking crises 
Herrera and Garcia (1999) 8 Latin American 
countries (1980-1998) 
Monthly financial and 
macroeconomic variables 
Index of Kaminsky et al. 
(1998). Threshold: Mean + 
1.5 std. dev. 
The model correctly predicts the crises in 
Ecuador, Brazil and Colombia 
Goldstein et al. (2000) 25 emerging and 
industrial countries 
(1970- 1997) 
Variables of Kaminsky and 
Reinhart (1997) + current 
account/GDP, short-term capital 
inflows, FDI, budget deficit, 
government expenditure, current 
account, and public sector credit 
Index and threshold of 
Kaminsky et al. (1998) 
Exchange rate, reserve loss, 
M2/international reserves, banking crises, 
stock prices, exports, current account 
deficit/GDP, current account 
deficit/investment 
Bruggeman and Linne 
(2002) 
Central and Eastern 
European countries, 
Turkey and Russia (1993-
2001 
Monthly macroeconomic 
indicators, indicators of capital 
flight risk and banking sector 
indicators 
Index and threshold of 
Kaminsky et al. (1998) 
International reserves, exchange rate, budget 
deficit, lending rate/deposit rate, bank 
deposits/GDP 
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El-Shazly (2002) Egypt (1995–2000) Monthly macroeconomic and 
financial indicators 
Index and threshold of 
Kaminsky et al. (1998) 
Imports, trade balance, international 
reserves, M2/international reserves, the real 
exchange rate, stock price index 
Edison (2003) Countries in Kaminsky et 
al. (1998) + 8 emerging 
countries (1970–1998) 
Variables of Kaminsky et al. 
(1997) + US output, US interest 
rates, oil prices, 
M2/International reserves, short-
term debt /foreign exchange 
reserves 
Index of Kaminsky et al. 
(1998). Threshold: mean 
+2.5 std. dev. 
The real exchange rate, short-term debt 
/foreign exchange reserves, M2/international 
reserves, stock prices 
Plata and Schrooten (2003) Argentina (1992-2002) Variables of Kaminsky et al. 
(1998) 
A weighted index consisting 
of international reserves and 
exchange rate. Threshold: 
when the index is at least 2 
std. dev. above its mean. 
M2/reserves, reserves, lending/deposit rate, 
real interest rate on deposits, real interest 
differential between the Argentinean and the 
US interest rate. 
Krznar (2004) Croatia (1996- 2003) Variables of Kaminsky et al. 
(1998) and Kaminsky and 
Reinhart (1999) 
A composite index  
consisting of the weighted 
average of all previously 
listed crisis indicators. 
Threshold: Threshold of 
Kaminsky et al. (1998) 
The real exchange rate, share of public 
finances in GDP, inflation, external debt, 
domestic credit 
Knedlik (2006) South Africa (1993-2006) Various monthly banking sector, 
financial and economic 
indicators 
Used 4 different crisis 
indices 
Debt, budget deficit, interest rate, imports, 
international Liquidity, gold prices 
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Table 2. Crises-Signals Matrix 
 Crisis within 12 months No crisis within 12 
months 
Total observations 
Signal issued A B A+B 
No signal issues C D C+D 
Total observations A+C B+D A+B+C+D 
Source: Kaminsky et al (1998) 
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Table 3. Potential Crisis Indicators 
Current Account   
Exports Declining export growth implies that the government may devalue in order to empower the exports. Besides it shows a loss in competitiveness 
and possible problems of domestic enterprises. It also inhibits the country’s ability to earn foreign exchange to finance an existing current 
account deficit (Kaminsky et al. 1998; Berg and Pattillo, 1999; Bruggemann and Linne, 2002) 
IFS line 70DZF 
Imports Excessive import growth may show that the exchange rate is overvalued which could lead to a loss in competitiveness and worsening in the 
current account. (Kaminsky et al. 1998; Berg and Pattillo, 1999; Edison, 2003). 
IFS line 71DZF 
Real Effective Exchange 
Rate Overvaluation a 
Used as a proxy of external vulnerability. Currency overvaluation could lead to deteriorations in the current account and is often perceived by the 
market as an indication that the country will have to devalue. It may also cause a loss of competitiveness and a recession. Ultimately it adversely 
affects a country’s ability to service its debt (Kaminsky et al. 1998; 1999; Dermirguc-Kunt and Detragiache, 2000)  
CBRT EDDS 
 
Trade Balance/GDP Weak exports or excessive import growth could lead to deteriorations in the current account which can lead to currency crises (Fratzcher, 2002; 
Edison, 2003). 
Exports-imports (IFS line 70DZF-
71DZF)/GDP (CBRT EDDS) 
Current Account 
Balance/GDP 
 
High deficits make the country vulnerable to expectation shifts and less capable to generate external revenue to finance a balance of payments 
problem whereas surplus is expected to indicate a diminished probability to devalue and thus to lower the probability of a crisis (Fratzcher, 2002; 
Kamin et al. 2001; Lanoie and Lemarbre, 1996; Marchesi, 2003). 
CBRT EDDS   
Capital Account   
International Reserves/GDP Declining level of international reserves may trigger a speculative attack against the currency and shows that a currency is under devaluation 
pressure. It may also be used as indicators of a country’s financial difficulty dealing with debt repayment. (Kaminsky et al. 1998; Berg and 
Pattillo, 1999; Marchesi, 2003). 
International Reserves (IFS line 
1LD)/GDP(CBRT EDDS) 
M2/International Reserves Used as a proxy of reserve adequacy. It measures the fraction of money holdings that are covered by international reserves. It assesses the short-
term liquidity and convertibility of a country’s currency. Fearing devaluation, economic agents may substitute local currency for foreign 
currency. Thıs ratio shows the extent to which the Central Bank can withstand this pressure. (Kamin et al. 2001;  Calvo, 1998; Fratzcher, 2003). 
M2 (IFS line 35ZLF)/International 
Reserves (IFS line 1LD) 
Short-Term Debt/Long-Term 
Debt 
Excesive reliance on short-term debt is an indicator of financial vulnerability as the shorter and more concentrated the debt maturity the more 
likely debt crises are to occur. In addition, short-term debt may increase a country’s exposure to sharp increases in interest rates, which may have 
additional negative consequences, as governments may need to increase taxes in order to service the debt (Barro, 1997; Borensztein et al. 2005). 
WDI* 
Short-Term Debt/ 
International Reserves 
A high short-term debt/international reserves ratio is a vulnerability indicator, signifying exposure to crises (Rodrik and Velasco, 1999). As a rule 
of thumb known as the Greenspan-Guidotti rule, it should be smaller than 100, i.e international reserves should cover at least the level of short-
term debt (Fratzcher, 2002).  
(Foreign debt with maturity of less 
than 1 year/international reserves) 
WB GDFS* 
FDI/GDP Higher amount of FDI implies a lesser share of the current account being financed by volatile portfolio inflows and should lower the probability 
of crisis. Also, higher FDI ratios may be indicative of more attractive economic policies and prospects. 
(IFS line 78 BED)/GDP 
 
Portfolio Investments/GDP Reflects the changes in expectations of foreign investors. When portfolio investments take a sudden drop or reverse, this can be taken as a sign of 
loss of confidence, and may be the immediate cause of a currency crisis (Jotzo, 1999). 
IFS line 78BFD/GDP 
(Data available after 1985) 
Capital Inflows/GDP Used as a proxy for financial account and vulnerability to a sudden stop of capital inflows (Komulainen and Lukkorilla, 2003) Capital Inflows (IFS line 
78BJD)/GDP 
Reserve Money (High-
Powered Money)/GDP 
Used as a proxy of seignorage, i.e. monetization of the government deficit. Currency crises may take place if a deficit is financed through 
seignorage, as this may cause agents to expect a crisis and push the economy to a bad equilibrium. (Obstfeld, 1986) 
Reserve money (IFS line 
BL)/GDP(CBRT EDDS) 
Financial Sector   
Banking Sector Fragility 
Index (BSFI) 
Used as a proxy for fragility of banking sector. The index consists of a weighted average of bank credits to the domestic private sector, bank 
deposit and the foreign liabilities of banks (See Kibritcioglu 2003 for details of calculation). Calculated as: [((%ΔCPS-μCPS)/σCPS  ) + ((%ΔFL–
μFL)/σFL) + ((%ΔDEP–μDEP)/σDEP)]/3 where %Δ  indicates the difference in 12-month changes in data that has been used. CPS, FL and DEP stand 
for credits to the domestic private sector, the foreign liabilities of banks and bank deposit, respectively. 
Foreign Liabilities of banks (IFS 
line 26C), credits to the domestic 
private sector (IFS line 32DZF), 
bank deposit (IFS line 24+ 25) 
M1 Used as a proxy of liquidity. High growth of M1 may indicate excess liquidity which can lead to speculative attacks on the currency thus leading 
to a currency crisis (Eichengreen et al. 1995). 
IFS line 34ZF 
M2 Multiplier A higher M2 multiplier indicates higher growth in money supply which may lead to higher inflationary expectations and expectations of a future 
devaluation of the currency. The resulting real appreciation of the exchange rate may put a peg under pressure (Bruggemann and Linne, 2002). 
M2 (IFS line 35 ZLF)/base money 
(IFS line 14ZF) 
Domestic Credit/GDP Excessive growth of domestic credit may serve as an indicator of the fragility of the banking system as it increases the chances of bank failures Domestic Credit(IFS line 
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due to balance sheet problems and in terms of non-performing loans and currency mismatches (Bruggemann and Linne, 2002) 32ZF)/GDP(CBRT EDDS) 
Deposit Money Banks Net 
Past Due Loans/Total Loans 
Used as a proxy for the quality of the asset portfolio and the credit risk. A high ratio is an indicator of inefficiency of the financial institutions  
(Rahman et al, 2004) 
CBRT EDDS (data available after 
1986) 
Excess Real M1 Balances Used as a proxy for excessive monetary expansion (Zhuang and Dowling, 2002). (IFS line 34/64)/(trend derived 
using Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter). 
Central Bank Credit to 
Public Sector/GDP 
Rapid growth in credit fueled by excessive monetary expansion makes the economy more vulnerable to crises (Corsetti et al. 1998;  Sachs et al 
1996). 
IFS line 12C (data available after 
1986) 
Domestic Real Interest Rates Used as proxy of financial liberalization. High real interest rates signal a liquidity crunch and can also increase the probability of loan defaults 
(Kaminsky et al. 1998; Edison, 2003; Dermirguc-Kunt and Detragiache, 2000). 
3-month deposit rate (IFS line 60L) 
Commercial Bank Deposits Used as a proxy of liquidity risk and banking sector fragility. Contractions in commercial bank deposits often reflect distress and problems in the 
banking sector and increase the chances of a bank run. Also, a weak banking system increases the probability of speculative attack since the 
investors know that the government will be reluctant to increase interest rates (Chang and Velasco, 2000; Berg and Pattillo 1999; Edison, 2003) 
IFS line 24+ IFS line 25 
Bank Reserves/Bank Assets Adverse macroeconomic shocks are less likely to lead to crises in countries where the banking system is liquid. High ratio indicates banks’ 
soundness (Dermirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1997). 
(IFS line 20ZF)/(IFS lines 
21+22a+22g (data available after 
1986) 
Foreign Liabilities/Foreign 
Assets of Banks 
Used as a proxy of banking sector fragility measuring exchange rate exposure and the imbalance between foreign currency denominated 
liabilities and foreign currency denominated assets (Corsetti et al 1998; Kibritcioglu, 2003).  
Foreign Liabilities (IFS line 
26C)/Foreign Assets of Banks (IFS 
line 21ZF) 
Commercial Bank Loans to 
Public Sector 
Currency and banking crises have been linked to rapid growth in credit fueled by excessive monetary expansion in many countries (Zhuang and 
Dowling, 2002). 
IFS line 12C (data available after 
1986) 
Commercial Bank Credit to 
Private Sector 
Used as a proxy for lending boom, which may increase the ratio of bad loans to total assets, thereby weakening the banking system. The rapid 
increase of the credit to the private sector may also indicate that a large amount of credit is going to dubious projects (Kibritcioglu, 2003). 
IFS line 32DZF 
Real Sector   
Industrial Production Index Economies are more vulnerable to crises when economic growth slows down. Lower output growth indicates a deceleration of the economy 
(Berg and Pattillo, 1999ş Hardy and Pazarbsioglu, 1999). 
CBRT EDDS** 
Stock Market Index 
 
A decline in the the asset prices may lead to loan defaults. It also signals a loss of investor confidence. Besides, it indirectly measures contagion 
(Kaminsky et al. 1998); Berg and Pattillo, 1999; Edison, 2003; Komilainen and Lukkarilla, 2003).  
ISE National -100 Index (CBRT 
EDDS, data available after 1996) 
GDP Per Capita 
 
Negative per capita growth is assumed to increase the policymaker’s incentives to switch to a more expansionist policy, which can be achieved 
through a nominal devaluation of the currency (Esquivel and Larrain, 1998). 
EDDS*  
Consumer Price Index (CPI) Inflation rate is likely to be associated with high nominal interest rates and may proxy macroeconomic mismanagement which adversely affects 
the economy and the banking system and may lead to currency instability (Dermirguc-Kunt and Detragiache, 1997; Lanoie and Lemarbre, 1996). 
IFS line 64XZF 
Fiscal Sector   
Fiscal Balance/GDP 
 
High deficits increase the vulnerability to shocks. They could lead to a worsening in the current account position, which could put pressure on the 
exchange rate (Dermirguc-Kunt and Detragiache, 2000;  Zhuang and Dowling 2002). 
Budget balance (IFS line 80 and the 
treasury web site)/GDP5* 
Public Debt/GDP Higher indebtedness is expected to raise vulnerability to a reversal in capital inflows, and hence to raise the probability of a crisis (Lanoie and 
Lemarbre, 1996). 
WDI * 
Government 
Consumption/GDP 
Higher expenditure net of revenues would have positive affect on the likelihood of crisis (Saqib, 2002). Large fiscal deficits could lead to a 
worsening in the current account position, which could in turn put pressure on the exchange rate (Zhuang and Dowling, 2002). 
Government Consumption (IFS line 
91F and WDI)/GDP* 
Global Economy   
US Real T-Bill Rate  High US interest rates may induce capital outflows (Edison, 2003; Kamin et al. 2001; Milesi-Ferretti and Razin, 1998). US T-bill rate (IFS 60p)-CPI (IFS 
line 64x) 
US GDP  Higher foreign output growth should strengthen exports and thus reduce the probability of a crisis (Edison, 2003; Kamin et al. 2001) WDI* 
World Oil Prices IFS line 176 (Crude oil prices)6High oil prices pose a danger to the current account position, and also could lead to domestic recessions (Edison, 2003). 
                                                          
5 Until 1999 from IFS line 80, after 1999 annual from treasury web site (www.hazine.gov.tr) 
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Real Interest Rate 
Differential 
Defined as foreign interest rates (3-month US deposit rate) less domestic interest rate (3-month Turkey deposit rate). The higher the differential, 
the larger is the probability of an outflow of reserves and may signal devaluation expectations (Komulainen and Lukkarilla, 2003).  
IFS line 60L for Turkey - IFS line 
60L for USA 
Political    
Government Change 
Dummy 
Used as a proxy for political instability. Takes the value of 1 if there is elections and 0, if otherwise (Feridun, 2004). The National Assembly of Turkey 
web site (www.tbmm.gov.tr) 
NOTES:   GDP used in calculations is obtained from CBRT EDDS is  linearly interpolatd from annual  (until 91) and monthly (after 91). 
* linerarly ınterpolated from annual data 
** liıneraly ınterpolatd from quarterly data  
a (CPI-based real effective exchange rate index calculated using the IMF weights for 19 countries) An increase in the index show apperaciation of the Turlish lira.  
   Calculated as: (REER-REERt-24)/REERt-24 (Fratzscher, 2002)  
 
 
 
Table 4. Performance of Indicators 
Variable Expected Impact 
on Crisis 
likelihood 
Threshold (in 
percentile) 
 
A/(A+C) B/(B+D) Noise/Signal 
Ratio 
P(Crisis/ Signal) 
A/(A+B) 
P(Crisis/ Signal)-P(crisis) 
(A+C)/(A+B+C+D) 
Government consumption/GDP + 80 0.083 0.035 0.424 0.500 0.381 
US Real T-Bill Rate + 95 0.046 0.102 0.446 0.462 0.396 
US GDP - 90 0.102 0.046 0.446 0.600 0.396 
GDP per capita - 5 0.056 0.025 0.455 0.500 0.378 
Fiscal Balance/GDP - 10 0.121 0.056 0.461 0.482 0.399 
Commercial Bank Loans to Public Sector + 80 0.241 0.111 0.462 0.435 0.420 
Excess real M1 balances + 90 0.231 0.111 0.480 0.440 0.426 
International Reserves/GDP - 25 0.306 0.152 0.495 0.429 0.425 
M2 Multiplier + 85 0.250 0.126 0.505 0.463 0.417 
Foreign Liabilities/Foreign Assets of Banks + 95 0.148 0.076 0.511 0.567 0.411 
Bank reserves/bank assets  - 5 0.105 0.054 0.511 0.389 0.245 
Imports + 95 0.176 0.091 0.517 0.458 0.426 
Commercial Bank Deposits - 25 0.278 0.157 0.564 0.444 0.438 
Exports - 20 0.278 0.162 0.582 0.433 0.438 
M2/International Reserves + 80 0.112 0.066 0.583 0.522 0.396 
Banking  Sector Fragility Index - 5 0.130 0.077 0.584 0.467 0.402 
Commercial Bank Loans to Private Sector + 95 0.120 0.071 0.587 0.490 0.435 
Capital Inflows/GDP + 85 0.120 0.071 0.587 0.462 0.396 
Reserve Money/GDP - 20 0.194 0.121 0.623 0.442 0.417 
Domestic Credit/GDP + 70 0.093 0.061 0.655 0.391 0.387 
CPI Growth + 85 0.176 0.116 0.660 0.444 0.420 
Short-Term Debt/Long-Term Debt + 75 0.037 0.025 0.681 0.444 0.372 
Short Term Debt/International Reserves + 95 0.176 0.102 0.744 0.511 0.432 
Portfolio investments/GDP  - 5 0.048 0.038 0.800 0.273 0.231 
Deposit money banks net past due loans/total loans + 95 0.048 0.038 0.800 0.272 0.231 
Central Bank Credit to Public Sector/GDP  + 93 0.063 0.053 0.842 0.267 0.234 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
6 US dollar per barrel (Spot prices) 
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Current Account Balance/GDP - 95 0.065 0.061 0.935 0.378 0.375 
Real Interest Rate Differential + 95 0.071 0.074 0.955 0.407 0.393 
Real Effective Exchange Rate Overvaluation + 85 0.065 0.071 1.091 0.324 0.396 
Industrial Production Index - 15 0.091 0.100 1.095 0.375 0.396 
Trade Balance/GDP - 5 0.091 0.105 1.149 0.364 0.396 
Stock Market Index  - 12 0.111 0.130 1.171 0.158 0.180 
Public Debt/GDP + 90 0.124 0.153 1.233 0.362 0.411 
Domestic Real Interest Rates + 95 0.093 0.116 1.255 0.219 0.381 
Government Changes + 0 0.037 0.046 1.227 0.375 0.378 
Oil prices + 90 0.083 0.111 1.333 0.333 0.393 
M1 + 85 0.221 0.363 1.645 0.343 0.463 
FDI/GDP - 5 0.161 0.290 1.800 0.295 0.430 
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Table 5. Average Lead Time  
Variable Average Lead time of the first 
signal (in months) 
Public Debt/GDP 10.4 
Stock Market Index 7.5 
US GDP 7 
Capital Inflows/GDP 6.6 
Foreign Liabilities/Foreign Assets of Banks 6.6 
GDP per capita 6.4 
Fiscal Balance/GDP 6.2 
Short Term Debt/International Reserves 6 
Excess real M1 balances 5.6 
CPI Growth 5.6 
Commercial Bank Deposits 5.6 
M2/International Reserves 5.4 
Portfolio investments/GDP  5.4 
Commercial Bank Loans to Public Sector 5 
CB Credit to Public Sector/GDP 5 
Banking  Sector Fragility Index 4.6 
Oil prices 4.6 
International Reserves/GDP 4.4 
M1 4.2 
Trade Balance/GDP 4.2 
Deposit money banks net past due loans/total loans 4.2 
Real Effective Exchange Rate Overvaluation 4 
Imports 3.8 
Current Account Balance/GDP 3.6 
Reserve Money/GDP 3.6 
Domestic Credit/GDP 3.4 
Commercial Bank Loans to Private Sector 3 
Domestic Real Interest Rates 2.8 
Government Changes 2.8 
Industrial Production Index 2.8 
Real Interest Rate Differential 2.8 
US Real T-Bill Rate 2.4 
Short-Term Debt/Long-Term Debt 2.4 
Bank reserves/bank assets 2.2 
FDI/GDP 2.2 
Exports 2 
M2 Multiplier 2 
Government consumption/GDP 1.2 
Average: 4.4 
                
Table 6. Persistence of Signals 
Variable Persistence During Crises 
Relative to Tranquil Times 
Government consumption/GDP 2.359 
US Real T-Bill Rate 2.242 
US GDP 2.242 
GDP per capita 2.198 
Fiscal Balance/GDP 2.170 
Commercial Bank Loans to Public Sector 2.165 
Excess real M1 balances 2.083 
International Reserves/GDP 2.020 
M2 Multiplier 1.980 
Foreign Liabilities/Foreign Assets of Banks 1.957 
Bank reserves/bank assets 1.957 
Imports 1.934 
Commercial Bank Deposits 1.773 
Exports 1.718 
M2/International Reserves 1.715 
Banking  Sector Fragility Index 1.712 
Commercial Bank Loans to Private Sector 1.704 
Capital Inflows/GDP 1.704 
Reserve Money/GDP 1.605 
Domestic Credit/GDP 1.527 
CPI Growth 1.515 
Short-Term Debt/Long-Term Debt 1.468 
Short Term Debt/International Reserves 1.344 
Portfolio investments/GDP  1.250 
Deposit money banks net past due loans/total loans 1.250 
CB Credit to Public Sector/GDP 1.188 
Current Account Balance/GDP 1.070 
Real Interest Rate Differential 1.047 
Real Effective Exchange Rate Overvaluation 0.917 
Industrial Production Index 0.913 
Trade Balance/GDP 0.870 
Stock Market Index 0.854 
Public Debt/GDP 0.811 
Domestic Real Interest Rates 0.797 
Government Changes 0.815 
Oil prices 0.750 
M1 0.608 
FDI/GDP 0.556 
 
Table 7. Conditional Probability of Crises: Composite Index 
Il  ≤ kt  ≤IU Pr(Ct, t-12|kt=j)  
0 ≤ kt  <5 0.568 
5  ≤ kt  < 10 0.545 
10l  ≤ kt  < 15 0.613 
15 ≤ kt  < 20 0.750 
20  ≤ kt  < 25 0.583 
25 ≤ kt  < 30 0.667 
30  ≤ kt  < 35 0.667 
35 ≤ kt  < 40 0.667 
40  ≤ kt  < 45 0.714 
45  ≤ kt  < 50 0.600 
50 ≤ kt  < 55 0.400 
55  ≤ kt  < 60 0.000 
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Figure 1. Exchange Market Pressure Index 
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